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THE REDISCOVERY OF EXPORTS
BY THE THIRD WORLD
By Richard C. Porter
and
Charles P. Staelin
DESPITE its theoretical limitations, empirical presumptions and
internal inconsistencies, what has come to be known as the
Prebisch-Singer-Myrdal theory of underdevelopment and "inward-
looking" development appeared destined to a long and effective
life, even to those whom it frightened. Throughout the 1950s,
the plans of the underdeveloped countries reflected the theory:
export estimates were mechanical projections rather than targets
to be attained, and the very estimates often seemed to be included for
little reason beyond the need for consistency in the import and
aid accounts.
Then, as the 1960s progressed, a change in the LDC attitude
towards exports occurred steadily and dramatically. Development
plans increasingly discussed the specific sectoral sources and geo-
graphical destinations of exports, and the policies whereby export
targets were to be implemented. Trade in general and exports in
particular played an ever larger part in the theories and strategies
of influential development thinkers. By 1964, the conversion was
-at the intellectual level at least-complete. Led by the former
high priest of "inward-looking" development, Prebisch, the poor
countries opened their UNCTAD thrust towards advanced-country
cooperation in the LDC efforts to expand exports. Although
UNCTAD was, in a limited sense, no more than a massive culmi-
nation of earlier LDC efforts to improve aid flows through various
export-support programmes to be financed by the advanced
economies, it was really much more. UNCTAD finally placed
LDC exports-among themselves and to the advanced world-
at the core of development theory and strategy.
The turnabout itself has been surprisingly sharp and rapid, but
the seeds of change were being gradually and cumulatively sown
throughout the post-World War II period. These seeds of change
are the subject-matter of this paper. They are discussed below
under five headings: (i) the growing LDC foreign exchange crisis,
(ii) the encouraging overall LDC export performance, (iii) the
impressive export performance of individual LDCs, (iv) growing
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doubts about the Singer-Prebisch-Myrdal thesis, and (v) the shifting
focus of development strategy.
LDC FOREIGN EXCHANGE CRISIS
The basic dilemma of LDC development has been that, despite
their efforts to free themselves of economic dependence on the
North Atlantic world, their dependence grows. Import-substitu-
tion strategies fail to lower the absolute level of imports and indeed,
often fail to lower even the ratio of imports to GNP.1 The basic
balance-of-payments "gap"," M - A = E, has loomed ever larger
in the 19505 and 1960s as the final constraint on LDC growth. If
import needs grow apace with GNP and aid flows fail to accelerate,
GNP growth is irrevocably tied to the growth of exports. This
is precisely the constraint which Prebisch and his followers had
hoped to break through industrialisation and import substitution."
To the extent the ratio of imports to GNP can be reduced, the
economy's overall growth is freed from its dependence on the growth
of exports and aid.
The "theory", being no more than a tautology, is no less true
today than when its first rough formulations began to appear nearly
a quarter of a century ago. However in most countries, industria-
lisation has in fact failed to reduce imports substantially either abso-
lutely or in relation to GNP. Rather, industrialisation has tended
to retard the growth of exports,' and import dependence, instead
of abating, has increased.
1 For example, H. Chenery and A. Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic
Development", American Economic Review, Sept. 1966, found that the median
marginal import ratio (to change of GNP) is no lower than the median average
import ratio (to GNP) for the 31 LDCs they study (p. 684; their marginal ratio
is calculated over 1957-62, their average is the "trend expected" 1962 value).
2 i.e., imports (M) - "aid" (A) = exports (E). "Aid" means, of course,
net capital account flows, public and private, long-term and short-term, grants
and loans. Reduction of LDC foreign exchange reserves would also be
included in "Aid", though this is a realistic possibility for few LDCs.
" See, for instance, R. Prebisch, "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped
Countries", American Economic Review, May 1959, pp. 252-254.
4 Maizels (Industrial Growth and World Trade, Cambridge University Press,
1963) concludes:
"I... much depends on the type of industrialisation and the general economic
and monetary policy being pursued; industrialisation can just as well promote
exports as retard them or, equally, have little or no significant influence
(CONTD.)
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Moreover, practical limitations have been increasingly recognised.
One, lowering the import ratio is not necessarily a concomitant of
the introduction of domestic industry, and two, lowering the import
ratio is increasingly difficult the lower the ratio gets. The two
problems are related. When import substitution begins, those
industries that are easily introduced, that use relatively little imported
raw materials, that require no difficult managerial or technical
inputs, that are efficient at a small scale of operation-in short,
those industries in which the LDC has little or no comparative
disadvantage-are first established and significant foreign exchange
savings may occur. As import substitution proceeds, however, the
net import-saving effect dwindles and the introduction, of high-
import-content, high-cost industries increasingly distorts the internal
price structure.5 This process makes it ever more difficult to lower
the marginal import ratio, and the price distortions may even make
it difficult to prevent inframarginal rises in ratio.
Statistical recognition of the problem came early, with the
observation of slow, or no, declines in LDC import ratios.6 And
this, coupled with the inexorable constraint, M-A = E, had been
creating some terrifying "gap" estimates. Given slow growth of
export earnings, the Development Decade target of 5 per cent LDC
growth was shown to require aid flows to fill "trade gaps" ranging
as high as $15 billion a year.' But the really terrifying aspect of
such gap estimates lay in the twin facts that the gross flow of aid
to LDCs was no longer expanding and that the net aid flows were
on the total export volume. It cannot therefore be assumed that industria-
lisation of a primary-producing country will, in itself, necessarily. have
adverse effects on the capacity to import ... " (p. 130).
There is general agreement, however, that certain policies which are often
concomitant with industrialisation efforts, overvalued exchange rates, high
tariffs and domestic price levels, and high profits in import substitution relative
to exports, do retard export growth. In many countries, export promotion
has been less an effort to push exports beyond their "normal" trend than a
remedial attempt to prevent their decline too far below "normal".
s See, for examples, D. Felix, "The Dilemma of Import Substitution-Argen-
tina", in G. Papanek (ed.), Development Policy: Theory and Practice, Harvard
University Press, 1968, and J. Bhagwati and P. Desai, India: Planning for
Industrialisation, Oxford University Press, 1970.
" For instance, the ratio of imports to national income in India did not
exhibit any falling trend over the period (calendar) 1949 to 1969 (although the
ratio was quite variable, year to year).
7 See, e.g., GATT, International Trade,- 1961, Geneva, 1962, pp. 15-17-
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being increasingly reduced by the return flows to service existing
LDC indebtedness.8
The causes of this statistical nightmare were also becoming
evident. The import substitutes, towards which LDCs eventually
gravitated, were requiring increasing proportions of imported raw
materials and components. In some cases, it has been shown that
the foreign exchange value of the import components of an LDC
product is so large that it would have cost less foreign exchange
to import the final product!' And in the majority of cases, the total
foreign exchange saved is less-often much less-than the value of
the final goods imports that have been "substituted". Even allowing
for (direct and indirect) imported inputs, the savings in total imports
will be overstated to the extent that domestic industry requires the
acquisition of imported machinery and spare parts, or foreign
licences, patents and technical assistance. Moreover, rapid increases
in GNP, partly as a result of the industrialisation process itself,
may mean increased consumer demand which cannot be more than
partly satisfied by increased domestic production.
Thus, import "substitution" has done little to reduce the depen-
dence on imports; in fact, to the extent the import needs are switched
from consumer goods to industrial raw materials, the dependence
of the production sector of the economy is increased. In times of
foreign exchange stress, imports can no longer be restricted without
serious direct repercussions on domestic employment, production
and investment. A foreign exchange shortage, instead of encourag-
ing the growth of domestic output, constrains it. A popular argu-
ment in the 1950s against dependence on exports was that it kept
the exporter vulnerable to the vagaries of world demand; paradoxi-
cally, import substitution has intensified this vulnerability.
8 Repayments of interest and principal on official bilateral loans rose from
12 per cent of gross bilateral aid flows in 1962 to 20 per cent in 1968; in Latin
America, debt service absorbed 15 per cent of exports in 1964 versus only 6
per cent eight years earlier. See OECD, Development Assistance Efforts and
Policies, various annual issues, Paris, and I. Frank, "New Perspectives on Trade
and Development", Foreign Affairs, April 1967, p. 523.
' If the domestic price of an import substitute is above the world price, and
if the import content is high, it may be profitable to import inputs at a total cost
greater than the imported price of the final good, selling the high-cost substitute
at the inflated domestic price. For evidence of this in Pakistan, see R. Soligo
and J. Stem, "Tariff Protection, Import Substitution and Investment Effici-
ency", Pakistan Development Review, Summer 1965. For evidence in India,
see J. Bhagwati and P. Desai, op. cit., pp. 352-363.-
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Recognition of the inevitability of the rising cost of saving foreign
exchange through import substitution came slowly, but was largely
achieved by the time of UNCTAD, at least among the relatively
developed of the underdeveloped nations. In the words of
Prebisch:
"The simple and relatively easy phase of import substitution
has reached, or is reaching, its limit in the countries where
industrialisation has made most progress. As this happens,
the need arises for technically complex and difficult substitution
activities, which usually require great capital intensity and very
large markets if a reasonable degree of economic viability is to
be attained. Thus there are limits to import substitution in the
developing countries which cannot be exceeded without a
frequent and considerable waste of capital."10
In short, the primary reason for the LDC rediscovery of exports
was no better-and no worse-than that growth in exports was
increasingly recognised as essential. With imports ever more
difficult to reduce (as a ratio to GNP), and with net aid flows no
longer expanding adequately, the choice to many LDCs was export
or stagnate; and by the early 196os this choice was abundantly
clear.
OVERALL LDC EXPORT PERFORMANCE
Theories can be maintained in the face of facts for incredible
lengths of time by reference to special circumstances. The Korean
primary-product boom, clearly such a special circumstance, meant
that LDC "export pessimism" could not even begin to be tested
until the late 1950s. As the evidence of the overall LDC export
performance began to accumulate, however, it became ever nearer
to impossible to maintain a posture of hopelessness about the LDC
export potential.
On the major, primary-product front, the events of the later
1950s were of course not exciting. The dizzying heights of the
Korean years were left behind, seemingly forever, and a decade-
long doldrums ensued. But doldrums differ from disaster. Within
that decade, the foreign exchange earnings of most of the products,
and of most of the LDCs, had reachieved their Korean peaks, and
evidence had begun to pile up that demand for most of the primary
10 UN, Towards a New Trade Policy for Development, /CONF. 46/3,
UN 1964, p. 21.
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products was not so price-inelastic or income-inelastic as the
"elasticity-pessimists" were insisting."
While the primary-product performance was nowhere near as
bad as had been feared, the growth of non-primary-product exports
of LDCs was undeniably encouraging. While exact measurement
depends upon the period chosen and the definition of "non-primary-
product", the trends are clear. Between 1952-53 and 1962-63,
for example," "all minor exports" of 29 underdeveloped countries
(i.e., those for which sufficiently detailed data were available) grew
from $2.7 billion to $4.5 billion, an annual compound rate of growth
of 5-5 per cent. Of these "all minor exports", "manufactures" grew
particularly rapidly, from $o.5 billion to $1.2 billion, an annual rate
of growth of 9.2 per cent.
As a result, the general picture for LDC exports was becoming
ever more favourable. Despite the primary-product setbacks in
the mid-195os, total LDC exports grew, during 1953-54 to 1959-60,
from $21.6 billion to $26.6 billion, an annual growth rate of 3.5
per cent.8 By 1965-66, however, total LDC exports had risen
to $37.6 billion, an annual growth rate of 5.9 per cent after 1959-60
and 4.7 per cent for the entire period after 1953-54.14 This near-
doubling of the overall growth rate of exports between the late
1950s and the early 1960s did not go unnoticed. Indeed, the espe-
cially encouraging performance of manufactures in the early 196s-
an increase of 14 per cent annually,5 leading to an increase in
the LDC share of world trade in manufactures from 4.0 per cent
in 1959-60 to 4.6 per cent in 1965-6616 - was greatly responsible
for the stress in UNCTAD on advanced-nation preferential tariffs
to LDC manufactures.
11 See, for example, B. deVries, The Export Experience of Developing Coun-
tries, World Bank Occasional Paper No. 3, 1967, or R. Porter, "Some Implica-
tions of Post-War Primary Product Trends", journal of Political Economy,
May-June 1970. Data show that, for two-thirds of the world's major primary
products, export earnings were higher in 1960-63 (not especially good years)
than in the Korean years, 1950-53 (see deVries, op. cit., pp. 77-78).
12 The data are taken from deVries, op. cit., p. 68; the ultimate source is
IMF, International Financial Statistics and UN, Yearbook of International Trade
Statistics.
13 Data are from GATT, Report, 1967, Geneva, 1967, p. 37.
14 Nurkse and others have pointed to the undue influence of petroleum
exports on the total, arguing that petroleum exports'constitute a special case.
However, even without petroleum, the trends are favourable.
15 For 1960-64, according to I. Frank, op. cit., p- 532.
16 GATT, Report, 1967, OP. cit., p. 37-
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EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF INDIVIDUAL LDCs
The accumulating statistics on LDC exports did not by any
means show equal success for all countries. Although the list of
stars and also-rans varies from year to year, the variations were far
from balancing out over the decade, 1950-53 to 1960-63. Over
this period, four LDCs'7---Greece, Jamaica, Peru and Taiwan
(China)-more than doubled their export earnings, while for six
others-Bolivia, Colombia, Egypt, Pakistan, Paraguay and Uruguay
-export earnings fell. The variety in LDC export experience
was even more "striking""' when only "minor exports" (i.e.,
essentially non-primary-product exports) are examined: of the 29
LDCs in deVries' sample, twelve more than doubled their minor
exports, while six experienced a decline. Thus; for only eleven of
the 29 countries, did minor exports grow at a "mild" positive
rate (i.e., between o and 7.2 per cent per year). For manufactured
exports, the variation is even greater: eighteen LDCs more than
doubled such exports,19 nine experienced declines, and only two
had mild positive growth rates.
These observed wide variations in export growth rates would not
have had much impact on LDC attitudes towards exports if successes
and failures were perceived to be accidents or the exogenous results
of unpredictable shifts in advanced-country demand patterns; indeed
the impact might have been negative. But studies, which attempted
to distinguish between controllable and uncontrollable influences
on LDC exports, concluded that the wide observed variations cannot
be explained simply by movements in the uncontrollable. Typically,
such studies calculate the export growth (or decline) that would
have occurred if the LDC had just maintained its base-year share
of the world market for each of its exports. Actual export movements
can then be divided into the constant-share demand vagaries and the
rising-share (and new export product) influence. From such a
division, it became clear that
".... the contrasting relative performances of individual countries
were only relatively little influenced by the pattern of their
traditional exports, being much more affected by largely supply-
determined shifts in market positions and by the development
df new lines of production for export".°
17 Of deVries' 29 countries. All data in this paragraph are from deVries,
op. cit., p. 68.
18 deVries' word, op. cit., p. 5.
19 Between 1952-53 and 1962-63.
20 GATT, International Trade, 1965, Geneva, 1966, p. 32. For a similar,
though more cautious conclusion, see deVries, op. cit., Chap. 3.
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More than just the data suggested that export success was, to a
large extent, in the hands of the LDC. The very policies of the
LDCs towards exports were visible and convincing. Those LDCs
that 4 'made a' significant effort to expand manufactured' [and other]
exports had remarkable success".21 Many of the policies to promote
exports are largely non-quantifiable and hence difficult to assess
-- e.g., foreign commercial representation, quality controls and market
research-but they are visible; and for the more quantifiable policy
factors, evidence '-of- their importance was steadily accumulating.
For example, 'deVries' cross-country",regressions howed that the
export "performance of countries with relatively strong inflation
tends to be poor".22
There has long been an undercurrent of belief that the LDC
export stagnation was in great part due to their excessive internal
aggregate demand, the autarkic bias of their planning processes,2
overvalued exchange rates, and the inevitable anti-export tendencies
of import-substitution policies. This collection of arguments received
periodic support from two types of institutional-empirical studies,
one which related secular declines in exports of 'particular countries
to particular policies24 and the other which related cyclical swings
in the exports of particular LDCs to their internal aggregate demand
and real exchange rates.25
_21A. Maddison, Economic Progress and Policy in Developing Countries, Allen
and Unwin, 1970, p. 205.
22 deVries, op. cit., p. 37.
23 Indeed, Viner long ago maintained that all planning must be so biased:
"I have so far been claiming only that there is in government activities an
inherent irrational bias towards autarky whose practical importance to
national economic planning automatically increases. I go farther now, and
.claim that there is a strong tendency in the logic of national economic
planning towards autarky".
J. Viner, International Trade and- Economic Development, Oxford University
Press, 1953, pp. 84-85.
2 The most important of these studies emanated from India; see M. Singh,
India's Export Trends, Oxford University Press, 1964, and B. Cohen, "The
Stagnation of Indian Exports, 1951-1961", Quarterly Journal of Ecdvmics,
Nov. 1968.
2 See, e.g., J. Sheahan, "Imports, Investment and Growth-Colombia",
pp. 111-112, in G. Papanek (ed.), op. cit., and D. Felix, "The Dilemma ... ",
op. cit., p. 90. The Indian recession from 1966-69 is often credited with fostering
the export boom in engineering goods and other manufactures. There is some
question as to whether the substantial growth in manufactured exports targeted
in the Fourth Plan is compatible with increased economic activity.
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Finally, examination of the varying export performances of
LDCs showed that countries too small to flirt with import-substi-
tuting-industrialisation-at-any-cost policies were doing significantly
better with their exports. In deVries' study for six of the ten large
countries,26 exports were growing more slowly than the constant-
market-share rate, while for twelve of the nineteen small countries,
exports were growing faster. It has become increasingly apparent
that large economic size permits an LDC to ignore, for a time at
least, the future of its exports and that many such large LDCs
have done so. Within a decade, for example, Argentina, Brazil and
India had together fallen almost one billion dollars behind their
constant-market-share export levels.27
In summary, some LDCs were doing noticeably well with exports
and their success was increasingly difficult to ignore. To the optimists,
it indicated that adoption of a proper package of export-promotion
policies could pay off handsomely in foreign exchange. But even
to the pessimists, it proved that some concern for exports was
needed, even where expansion seemed unpromising, if only to
prevent other LDCs from infiltrating the country's existing
export markets.
GROWING DOUBTS ABOUT THE PREBISCH-
SINGER-MYRDAL THESIS
The apparently inevitable asymmetry in the international economic
relations of developed and underdeveloped countries was, despite
the theoretical weaknesses of the underlying analysis, emotionally
convincing in the 1950s. Although persistent critiques of the Prebisch-
Singer-Myrdal theory helped to weaken this conviction, the
reluctance of emerging fact to conform was most damaging. A major
concern, orrather presumption, in the discussions of the 1950s was
the -"notorious inelasticity of demand for primary commodities"28
with respect to both prices and incomes. However, one study of
46 primary products over the post-World War II period concluded
that "demand for primary products typically may be very price-
inelastic or very income-inelastic, but the common belief that it is
26 deVries, op. cit., pp. 25 and 85. "Large" countries were those with GDP
greater than $4 billion in 1963.
27 Over 1950-53 to 1960-63; see deVries, op. cit., p. 25. For more detailed
data on India's constant-market-shares, ee Cohen, op. cit.
28 H. Singer, "The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing
Countries", American Economic Review, May 1950 (reprinted in J. Theberge,
Economics of Trade and Development, John Wiley and Sons, 1968, p. 242).
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both price-inelastic and income-inelastic is not supported by the
data".29
More generally, the Singer-Prebisch-Myrdal thesis was con-
cerned with the inevitable deterioration of the terms of trade for
primary producers. "The" terms of trade has been the object of
economists' opinions, theories and empirical studies for over half a
century, and it was not long before Prebisch's speculations were put
in perspective as but one more such effort. Indeed, Prebisch's
expectations were seen to run counter to typical earlier thought,
which maintained that diminishing returns to primary production
would cause LDC terms of trade to rise secularly. And the evidence
that accumulated-even more rapidly than before, for both Prebisch's
supporters and detractors worked diligently-continued to give
support to either, or neither, theory. While the results varied for
different concepts and coverage, broad conclusions were that the
LDC terms of trade, in the late 195os, had (a) worsened relative to
the early 1950s, (b) improved relative to the mid- 1930s, and
(c) remained about the same relative to the 1920s.30 Studies of
particular LDCs also failed to give consistent support to the
Prebisch conjecture. And finally, studies of particular primary
products again failed to show any consistent trends.
These empirical findings on LDC terms of trade were continually
faced by theoretical polemics of three kinds. One, many economists
of stature such as Haberler, Viner and Cairncross spoke out
frequently, encyclopaedically and convincingly against the declining-
terms-of-trade argument. As an example of their vehemence:
"... I find myself almost entirely out of sympathy: the world
economy is not so constructed that primary-producing countries
are doomed to a degringolade in their terms of trade with indus-
trial countries.. ."I
A not too exaggerated parody of their diatribe would run: the
terms of trade are not turning against the LDCs; but even if they are,
they are not turning against all LDCs; but even if they are, the gains
from trade are not necessarily measured by the terms of trade; etc.
29 R. Porter, "Some Implications of Post-War Primary Product Trends",
op. cit., p. 586.
30 See, e.g., GATT, Trends in International Trade, Geneva, 1958, p. 20, and
T. Morgan, "Trends in the Terms of Trade and Their Repercussions on Primary
Producers", in R. Harrod and D. Hague (eds.), International Trade Theory in a
Developing World, MacMillan, 1963. This latter contains a good review of the
terms-of-trade theories and findings.
31 A. CairnCross, "International Trade and Economic Development",
Economica, August 1961, p. 238.
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Two, there began to appear specific logical critiques of Prebisch's
reasoning. The most comprehensive of these, by Flanders,? revealed
several inherent inconsistencies in the Prebisch analysis of the
tendency of the terms of trade to turn against primary products.
But most damaging was Flanders' assertion that declining terms of
trade were essentially irrelevant to the Prebisch case for protection
and industrialisation." The Prebisch thesis can rest, theoretically,
on the presumption of either (a) balance-of-payments difficulties,
that is, imports growing faster than exports, or (b) monopoly power
of LDCs in the export of primary products. (Whether these pre-
sumptions are empirically relevant is of course another question.)
The Prebisch theory of deteriorating terms of trade was seen to be
irrelevant in another sense as well. It has long been recognised that
when the terms of trade decline through increased productivity,
there is no necessary loss in welfare; the most that can be said
is that a country has failed to gain all that it could." The relevant
measure is not the barter terms of trade, but the factoral terms of
trade, that is, the returns to the country's factors of production.
And three, it began to be suggested that declining LDC terms
of trade, where true, were not exogenous, but were perhaps the fault
of the economic structure and policies of the LDCs themselves.
The suggestion began with Kindleberger," who felt that declining
LDC terms of trade might be due to their lack of flexibility and hence
to their inability to make smooth and profitable adjustments to
changing economic circumstances (i.e., to switch from products
whose prices are falling to those whose prices are rising). Evidence
along these lines surfaces periodically as, most recently:
"... Not only do the more advanced countries (that is, those of
North America and Western Europe) tend to dominate the export
of the highly income-elastic primary products, but this domination
has tended to increase since the late 19305 ... the rate of down..
ward-and-outward shift of supply curves appears to have been
smaller for the primary products which the poorer countries
dominate. While this supply finding cannot be confidently
82 Flanders, "Prebisch on Protectionism: An Evaluation", Economic Journal,
June 1964 (in Theberge, op. cit.).
" Ibid., p. 317.
34 Prebisch asserts that advanced countries appropriate the gains from pro-
ductivity in their export sectors through rising wages, while the stable wages
in LDCs, by allowing prices to fall, prevent the LDCs from doing the same.
But as Johnson has pointed out, Prebisch confuses money wages and real wages.
Real wages in both the centre and the periphery are unchanged. See H. Johnson,
Economic Policies Towards Less Developed Countries, Praeger, 1967, pp. 249-250-
' In The Terms of Trade: A European Case Study, Wiley, 1956.
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interpreted, it suggests that the greater ability of the advanced
countries to raise productivity in primary products is part of the
explanation of their increasing domination of the more income-
elastic products ... "
Simultaneously with this attack on the belief in secularly falling
LDC terms of trade, another battle was raging concerning the extent
and importance of cyclical instability in LDC exports. As with the
terms-of-trade argument, this emerging fact has failed to offer
much support to the belief, so confidently forwarded in the 1950s,
that the extent and consequences of export instability are greater
for underdeveloped than advanced countries. Although this
assertion had never long remained unscathed by its opponents'
jabs," the empirical wounds were deepened in the early 196os.
MacBean's careful examination of the instability thesis concluded:
"... the importance of short-term export instability to under-
developed countries has been exaggerated. There is little evidence
to show that in general their economies have been damaged."M
MacBean does not deny that there are unstable primary products
and that countries specialising in such products will have highly
unstable export proceeds; but he does show that differences in the
instability of export proceeds for poor and rich countries are "not
large"." More critically, MacBean found that export instability
per se had little serious repercussion on the growth and welfare of
the underdeveloped countries:
"All in all, our search for evidence demonstrating the adverse
influence of short-term instability of export earnings on the
prospects of growth in underdeveloped countries gives us no
grounds for believing that export instability is in fact so harmful.
Almost every chain of reasoning leading to the conclusion that
serious damage is inflicted by instability has been found wanting
when confronted with analyses of UN and IMF data. Put at its
weakest, the case for viewing export instability as a severe
deterrent to economic growth in most underdeveloped countries
is not proven. Moreover, for certain of the ways in which it
is supposed to affect growth--e.g., through the quantity ~of
investment-the weight of evidence is against.""0
86 R. Porter, "Some Implications .. .", op. cit., p. 586.
37 See, for example, S. Caine, "Instability of Primary Product Prices-A
Protest and a Proposal", Economicfjournal, Sept. 1954.3 A. MacBean, Export Instability and Economic Development, Harvard
University Press, 1966, p. 339.
39 Ibid., p. 48.
40 Ibid., p. 127.
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While MacBean's (and others') conclusions are not everywhere
accepted," they have succeeded in placing the LDC-export-
instability fear in a calmer perspective.
Also influential on LDC export attitudes and policies has been
the gradual recognition that not all export instability is the exogenous
result of advanced-country demand fluctuations. As recently as
1958, Nurkse asserted that:
"The parallel movement of export prices and export quantities
reflects unmistakably the dominant role of demand conditions.
It furnishes conclusive proof--if proof were needed--that the
export fluctuations of primary producing countries originate in
the world's industrial centres."42
Moreover, in the many pages of discussion of this Nurkse article,
no one ever contested this basic premise. Since then, Nurkse's
methodology has been challenged," and his claim concerning the
"dominant role of demand" questioned. One recent study, for
example, concludes much more cautiously.
"... for a great many commodities, it is incorrect to blame
price fluctuations on either demand or supply unless very specific
assumptions can be made about the short-run price elasticities
of demand and/or supply.""
While the instability debate is undoubtedly far from over, its per-
ceived importance has steadily declined and LDCs are today more
aware that there are supply, as well as demand, ingredients in the
problem. In short, for both the terms-of-trade and the instability
debates, the point here is not who is right. It is that legitimate
empirical doubts have been implanted. At the best, it has meant
that export promotion is examined without preconception. But, in
any case, these growing doubts have led LDCs to recognise the
importance of avoiding policies that temporarily destabilise or
permanently discourage exports.
4 See, for example, Maddison, Economic ... , op. cit., who maintains that
"academic analysts have ... understated the instability problem" (p. X04).
42 R. Nurkse, "Trade Fluctuations and Buffer Policies of Low-Income
Countries", Kyklos, Fasc. 2, 1958, pp. 141-142.
4 i.e., that "parallel movement" reflects nothing "unmistakably" is shown in
R. Porter, "On Placing the Blame for Primary Product Instability", International
Economic Review, Feb. 1970.
" R. Porter, "Who Destabilises Primary Product Prices ?", Indian Economic
Journal, April-June 1969, p. 390.
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SHIFTING Focus OF DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
The limitations of the import- substitution path have been
increasingly recognised as more and more LDCs have pushed into
its higher-cost regions. Intuitive recognition of the costliness
and, more recently, measurement by means of effective protection
or domestic cost of foreign exchange" have led to the renaissance
of an old-fashioned virtue: efficiency. Although it is recognised,
today more than ever, that achievement of static efficiency cannot
ensure rapid growth, it is also increasingly seen that the vital invest-
able surplus, always small in a poor country, can be swallowed up
by inefficiency. It is this line of thought that has induced re-
examination of the often vastly different domestic cost of foreign
exchange at the margin of exporting and importing.
Efficiency also has a subtler side. LDCs, which have encouraged
their exporters, not only have rediscovered a relatively cheap source
(in the sense of resource cost) of foreign exchange but also have
received pleasant side-effects, some of those dynamic effects which
were once thought to derive only from the so-called balanced growth.
The process of expanding exports in one part of the economy seems
to accompany greater efficiency in other sectors, perhaps because it
indicates a general shift towards an efficiency-oriented government
policy mix. It is of course difficult to measure such a side-effect
precisely, but it is the most obvious way of explaining the high
correlations between GNP and export growth." Such a connection
between GNP and export growth may also occur through saving
(which after all, is one of the intersections of efficiency and growth).
Economists have long suspected, and the evidence increasingly
supports their conjecture,1' that exports and savings are related
to each other and to efficiency and growth. Development strategy
also recognises the possibility of this nexus. This recognition may
" Such measurements have been made for Turkey by A. Krueger, "Some
Economic Costs of Exchange Control: The Turkish Case",.Journal of Political
Economy, October 1966, and Pakistan by Soligo and Stern, op. cit., and G.
Hufbauer, "West Pakistan Exports: Effective Taxation, Policy Promotion, and
Sectoral Discrimination", Harvard Development Advisory Service Report
No. xx8, 1968. For India, see Bhagwati and Desai, op. cit.
46 Even more striking, GNP growth is better "explained" by exports than
capacity to import. See, e.g., A. Maizels, Exports and Economic Growth of
Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, 1968, pp. 41-49.
4 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 93-96, which concludes:
".... the regression results can reasonably be taken as supporting the view
. .. that there is likely to be a positive association in many primary-exporting
countries between exports and saving." (p. 96)
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have come in part from the declining importance of foreign con-
trolled export firms in LDC exports, not necessarily because they
no longer exist, but because they are more effectively controlled
and taxed by LDC governments. The savings, which have tra-
ditionally been generated through exports, have increasingly been
absorbed domestically rather than being repatriated abroad. In
addition, the traditional export "enclave" has been steadily absorbed
into the rest of the economy, allowing savings to flow from the
export sector into the domestic economy and setting up those other
linkages between exports and domestic production which balanced
and unbalanced theorists had despaired of ever seeing.
A second shift in the focus of development strategy with impli-
cations for exports has been the growing concern for employment.
This concern, together with the existence of excess capacity in
many of the already established import-substitution industries of
LDCs, has led naturally to the idea that, with exports, employment
could be created beyond the output demands of the domestic market
and with little need for additional investment. This is of course
precisely the obverse of the thinking of early protectionists, who
argued for industrialisation to create employment beyond the output
demands of foreign markets, using the free labour of the disguised
unemployed.8 More generally, while there was much debate
in the 1950s whether LDCs should seek highly labour-intensive
industry',---in accordance with their factor endowments-the
fact of the past quarter century's LDC industrialisation is that it
has been shockingly capital-intensive"° and promises to be ever
more so as import-substitution further encompasses high-cost,
comparatively disadvantaged industries. The growing urban
unemployment of LDCs, politically dangerous as well as economically
wasteful, has renewed interest in the early industries of import-
substitution, usually the labour-intensive industries processing
domestic raw materials and/or requiring few complex managerial or
worker skills. Since output here already satisfies internal demand,
this means exports. Fortunately, these long-established, labour-
intensive industries are usually the ones whose outputs LDCs
48 See, for instance, Prebisch, "Commercial Policy . . .", op. cit., especially
pp. 254, 26o and appendix.
49 The best known dissent is W. Galenson and H. Leibenstein, "Investment
Criteria, Productivity, and Economic Development", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, August 1955.
s0 See, e.g., A.R. Khan, "Capital-Intensity and the Efficiency of Factor in
Use: A Comparative Study of the Observed Capital-Labour Ratio of Pakistan
Industries", Pakistan Development Review, Summer 1970.
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can hope to sell in world markets and whose demands are reasonably
income-elastic.51
Many examples can be given of the kinds of products in which
LDC exports are already making inroads in world trade. LDC
exports rose during 1961-65 by at least US$20 million and the LDC
share of total world trade increased for all of the following products:
preserved fruits (o53),52 preserved vegetables (055), shaped wood
(243), inorganic chemicals (513), medicines and pharmaceuticals
(541), leather (611), plywood veneers (631), woven cotton
fabrics (652), floor coverings and tapestries (657), pig iron
(671), telecommunications apparatus (724), travel goods and
handbags (831), clothing excluding fur (841), perambulators,
toys, games and sporting goods (894) and manufactured articles
n.e.s. (899). Of course, not all LDCs have been equally successful
participants in this growth but not all have been equally resolute.
However, the number of LDCs, whose exports of manufactures and
semi-manufactures to advanced countries have risen rapidly, is
now sufficiently great, so that the potential has been demonstrated.
For example, the following LDCs increased such exports by 50
per cent over 1961-65 to a level above US$20 million in 1965:
Hong Kong (to US$724 million in 1965), Mexico ($187 million),
Taiwan ($146 million), Brazil ($131 million), Malaysia/Singapore
($87 million), Philippines ($88 million), Pakistan ($71 million),
Korea (s61 million), Chile ($61 million), Jamaica ($51 million),
Panama ($38 million), UAR ($34 million) and Guinea ($25 million).5a
All of these countries have claimed interest in.exports and all have
implemented this interest in their economic policy.
In the final analysis, the Prebisch-Singer-Myrdal thesis of
"inward-looking" development failed because it did not conform to
the facts. And countries that have followed its policy prescriptions
have--increasingly, unfortunately and conspicuously-realised
these failings. The lesson is clear: with rare exceptions (and among
today's LDCs, possibly with no exception), non-dependent, yet
sustained, development is impossible without significant increases in
export earnings. In this paper, we have reviewed the sources from
which flowed the gradual recognition of this lesson. But it should
be noted, and noted well, that the better part of a quarter century
51 See, e.g., UNCTAD Secretariat, The International Division of Labour and
Developing Countries, TD/4o, 19 January 1968.
52 The figures in parentheses is the three-digit SITC number. Source:
UNCTAD Secretariat, Review of Trade in Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures,
TD/io/Supp., 1,31i Oct. 1967, Table 8.
"' Ibid., Table 6.
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has been involved in this flow, and the "inward-looking" tide is,
even now, not fully ebbed in the populist development writings.
We can, perhaps, draw one forward-looking lesson from this
experience. The economic and political complexity of the under-
developed world plus the magnitude of the development task have
long served to disguise the essential role of exports. LDC govern-
ments and tacticians must now be discouraged from overreaction,
i.e., from an excessive embrace of exports as a new panacea. Now
that the critical role of exports in the development drama has been
discovered-or rather, rediscovered-its lines remain to be written.
Successful use of the export-oriented strategy will ultimately depend
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